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Bruce Huber's thoughtful article, "The Durability of Private
Claims to Public Property, "' is an excellent demonstration of the
ways that older uses of the federal public lands continue long past the
times they should be expected to expire. But the federal public lands
are not necessarily a stand-in for public property in general; most
other kinds of public property have far fewer and less intense prob-
lems with durable private claims, or indeed with private claims at all.
The federal public lands, on the other hand, have a set of particular
characteristics that lend themselves to a pattern in which private users
first assert and then overstay their entitlements. The problem of dura-
ble claims on the public lands is in some ways an instance of the prob-
lem of regulatory change, made more acute by the special character-
istics of the federal public lands. This commentary flags one of these
characteristics in particular: the echoes of a very old concern about
the potential linkage between a federal "endowment" of large public
lands and autocratic government-a concern that, to some degree,
still animates opponents to federal assertions of control over the pub-
lic lands.
In the spring of 2014, rancher Cliven Bundy, together with a group of
self-appointed armed "militiamen," placed himself in a standoff with the
Federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in southern Nevada. The BLM
insisted that Bundy owed over $1 million in delinquent and current fees for
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grazing his livestock on federally owned land, but Bundy insisted that graz-
ing on this land should be costless to him and refused to pay. Bundy's group
effectively chased off the federal officials and, in doing so, garnered con-
siderable conservative media support-at least until Bundy himself made
some extemporaneous and intemperate remarks about he state's African-
American population.2 Not surprisingly, his reference to alleged welfare
freeloading invited comparison to his own considerable outstanding bill for
the use of federal property. 3
Bundy' s set-to with federal officials bears closely on the topic of Bruce
Huber's important article on the persistence of private claims to publicly
owned property.4 In Huber's account, the federal public lands exemplify a
situation in which the federal government essentially loses control of federal
public lands to pre-existing private claims that then become entrenched.
Even when public property is repurposed for all future development, Huber
argues, the earlier nonconforming claims persist long beyond any plausible
legal entitlement. Bundy's case is perhaps an exception to Huber's account
insofar as the BLM has kept alive its claims for grazing fees, but it is quite
consistent insofar as longtime western cattle ranchers have continued to en-
joy "the largesse of a friendly public landlord" (as libertarian law professor
James Huffman put it).
5
Huber argues that many private claims to use public property originated
in an earlier era in which the federal government' s chief desiderata for the
public lands were settlement and resource exploitation, for both economic
and defense reasons-the latter at a time when other nations like Great Brit-
ain and Russia threatened to make inroads on America's newly acquired
lands.6 This was the era in which federal management followed what Huber
2. Adam Nagourney, A Defiant Rancher Savors the Audience That Rallied to His
Side, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.con2014/04/24/us/politics/rancher
-proudly-breaks-the-law-becoming-a-hero-in-the-west.html.
3. Ralph Ellis & Greg Botelho, Rancher Says He's Not Racist, Still Defiant Over
Grazing Battle, CNN (April 25, 2014, 6:16 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/24/poli-
tics/cliven-bundy-interview (Bundy responding "I might be" to interviewer's inquiry
whether Bundy is a "welfare queen" because his livestock have been "feeding off the gov-
ernment, literally").
4. Huber, supra note 1.
5. James Huffman, Book Review: 'A Climate of Crisis' by Patrick Allitt, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 23, 2014, 7:06 PM), http://www.wsj.conarticles/SB1000142405270230451250457
9496060586409076.
6. Huber, supra note 1, at 996-97.
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calls the "open access" model.7 Even though resource use patterns were
chaotic during this era, there was nothing particularly problematic for gov-
ernment policy about private claims to resources, no matter how long they
endured; settlement and rapid development, after all, were the objectives of
federal land policy. Beginning in the later nineteenth century, however, the
open access model gradually gave way to a "proprietary" model in which
the federal government planned to direct the use of the public lands specif-
ically, marking some for conservation and others for other specified uses
for which the government should receive due recompense. 
8
But according to Huber, even though the proprietary model now more
or less dominates governmental policy concerning the public lands, and
even though this model and precludes new claimants from many of the older
types of uses, public land management has been noticeably lenient toward
old claims that have held over from the open access model. Old leases are
renewed and illegal nonconforming uses continue without expulsion or re-
vision. Other nonconforming prior uses even expand in defiance of the new
proprietary model.9 Huber gives many examples of this pattern, including
the ways that local ranchers have controlled federal grazing areas 10-a topic
brilliantly exposed in Phillip Foss's Politics and Grass1 -and, more re-
cently, the confrontation between federal officials and the defiant holdover
permittees of an oystering business in Point Reyes, California. 12 Huber
could have given many more. One notorious example is the western "prior
appropriation" system of water rights that developed during the Gold Rush
era as miners and stockmen trespassed on federal land and took water out
of surface streams, in defiance of then-existing federal water laws requiring
users of surface waters to leave those waters largely instream. 1 3 Indeed, so
thoroughly have western water appropriators reversed the older instream
rule that the law switched to their side in western states, and appropriation
7. Id. at 997.
8. Huber, supra note 1, at 1030-32.
9. Id. at 1015.
10. Id. at 1004-05.
11. PHILLIP 0. FOSS, POLITICS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING ON THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN (1960).
12. Huber, supra note 1, at 1035.
13. For a recent book on the origins of the western "appropriative" water system, see
DAVID SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS, AND DIS-
TRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER (2012).
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spokesmen there have challenged the legality of any reservation of water
for instream public uses. 14
As Huber observes, the durability of pre-existing private claims creates
a number of headaches for public lands management, notably that pre-ex-
isting land uses are often inconsistent with conservationist plans, and that
they give a kind of unfair, almost monopolistic privilege to "grandfathered"
claimants. 15 Huber uses this pattern of persistent private claims as evidence
for his argument that there is a large gap in most current theories of the
evolution of property rights: these theories presume that the endpoint of
evolution consists of private rights, but they give us very little in the way of
a theory of property owned by governments. 
1 6
To be sure, aside from evolutionary theories, the topic of public property
has not been neglected by any means; property scholars have generated a
number of overall theories of public property, most notably in the vast num-
ber of works concerning the "public trust" that followed Joseph Sax's sem-
inal article on that topic over forty years ago. 17 Moreover, the works of Eli-
nor Ostrom and her colleagues have engendered a considerable amount of
legal scholarship on commonly held property, which some might think re-
sembles governmentally owned property or evolves into it, and which in-
deed does overlap with governmental property in some very long-standing
instances, such as the age-old water courts in the Spanish province of Va-
lencia. 1 8 By the same token, scholars like Katrina Wyman have analyzed
the institutional factors that influence the direction and scope of publicly
regulated resources. 19
14. See, e.g., Idaho Dept. of Parks v. Idaho Dept. of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 928
(Idaho 1974) (rejecting challenge to state agency's reservations of instream water for en-
vironmental purposes).
15. Huber, supra note 1, at 1037-38.
16. Id. at 1019-20, 1037. For a classic evolutionary account, see Harold Demsetz, To-
ward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
17. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Ju-
dicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
18. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITU-
TIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 71-76 (1990). For a discussion of the impact of Ostrom's
work on American legal academics, see Carol M. Rose, Ostrom and the Lawyers: The
Impact of Governing the Commons on the American Legal Academy, 5 INT'L J. COMMONS
28 (2011).
19. See, e.g., Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution
of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117 (2005).
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But Huber' s more specific issue-the persistence of inconsistent private
claims on supposedly repurposed public property-does seem to present a
rather puzzling gap in current thinking about property and an odd difference
between governmentally and individually owned property. A private owner
is generally quite capable of changing the purposes of her property without
giving particular deference to prior uses, so long as all legal claims are met.
If I own a lot and lease it out as a gas station, I can later change my mind,
refuse to renew the lease, demolish the existing structure, and build a com-
mercial building on the lot. I have to wait out or buy out the lease term of
the existing tenant, and I will have to meet environmental cleanup standards
and land use regulations, but I owe nothing to the prior lessee aside from
respect for his or her legal lease and perhaps notice of my change of plans.
Even the favorable treatment accorded to residential tenants in rent control
jurisdictions is a matter of legal obligation on private owners, rather than
any "largesse" on the part of those owners.
What, then, is the source of this indulgence toward prior users of public
property? That phenomenon differs from the local governmental grandfa-
thering of pre-existing nonconforming uses when land-use regulations
change. Regulatory grandfathering also produces vexing long-term holdo-
vers of anti-environmental uses and monopoly-like privileges for prior
claimants.20 But with this more familiar form of grandfathering, the prior
claimant is the owner of the property in question and had a legal right to
indefinite use prior to the change in regulatory practice; in such cases,
grandfathering is effectively an alternative to compensation for a valid en-
titlement.2 1 This is not true for claims like those of Bundy, whose grazing
allowance was time-limited all along, or those of cabin residents in the na-
tional parks, whose initial rights do not include year-round residence.
Huber's historical discussion of the federal public lands suggests that
past practice is particularly important for those properties. Past entitlements
here seem to cast a special shadow on the future, eclipsing the public's cur-
rent entitlement to take back its property. Accordingly, we have to address
the question: why does past practice appear to loom large in the case of the
federal public lands?
20. See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1225-28, 1283-87 (2009); Deepa Varadarajan, Note, Billboards and
Big Utilities: Borrowing Land-Use Concepts to Regulate "Nonconforming" Sources Un-
der the Clean AirAct, 112 YALE L.J. 2553, 2555-56, 2567 (2003).
21. Cf Varadarajan, supra note 20, at 2555.
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One possibility is that upon reflection, the phenomenon is illusory. Per-
haps public property and private property are not so different with respect
to the phenomenon of durable private claims (hereinafter DURPRICLs),
and DURPRICLs are not really so unusual after all on any kind of property.
That is to say, even on private property, I might find it harder to expel my
gas station tenant than the formal law suggests, so that private property and
public property are alike after all with respect to prior claimants. No matter
whether property is public or private, some users that have established
themselves and stayed in place for a long time can be hard to shake off. This
is certainly true of non-human invaders, like weeds and gophers; these in-
souciant invaders can create hell for property owners, and the DURPRICL
phenomenon for them may occur simply because the owner is incapable of
getting rid of them once they have dug in. Some human private tenants can
be extraordinarily tenacious too, like the one-time homeowner in Florida
who managed to evade foreclosure for well over two decades.22 With a cer-
tain modicum of embellishment, a tenant from hell might even become the
stuff of a screenplay.
23
Some of these rather unusual cases derive from excessive deployment
of tenant or homeowner protection laws, but even aside from those laws,
DURPRICLs run through several important areas of ordinary property law.
Are not DURPRICLs the essence of the venerable principle of "first in time,
first in right"? There are all sorts of explanations for this principle: the su-
perior defensive position of the first taker (rather like established weeds and
the gophers); the signal that coming first sends about the intensity of the
taker's desire for the object; the manner in which first takers of different
objects might reciprocally respect and defend one another' s holding; and so
on. 24 Moreover, the user who is not first, but only a longtime possessor, can
also be assimilated to the first mover in our property law. The doctrine of
22. See Robbie Whelan, The 25-Year 'Foreclosure from Hell', WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4,
2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870386500457564890
0250047766.
23. See PACIFIC HEIGHTS (20th Century Fox 1990); however, fictional treatments fa-
voring landlords over tenants are rare. See Michael D. Gottesman, End Game: Understand-
ing the Bitter End of Evictions, 8 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 63, 65 n. 18 (2008) (reporting that
Pacific Heights was the only popular account the author could find that took the side of the
landlord).
24. See Carol M. Rose, The Law Is Nine-Tenths of Possession: An Adage Turned on
Its Head, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 40, 49-53, 55-57 (Yun-Chien Chang
ed., 2015) (describing several explanations for the status of first possession).
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adverse possession may allow a longtime resident to displace even a true
owner-a widely recognized version of DURPRICLs in American law.
Even so, first possessors are not trespassers, and they do not encroach
on anyone else's property. As for adverse possession, this doctrine too has
a number of requirements that counteract DURPRICLS. Perhaps most im-
portant is the formal or informal requirement that the adverse possessor
have some excuse for the trespass-or, as it is more technically described,
he or she must have a "claim of right." 25 Successful adverse possession of
private property depends in considerable measure on the opinions of ordi-
nary people in the neighborhood and on the jury, and ordinary people do
not like willful trespassers.26 By contrast, on the federal public lands ad-
verse possession is technically not permitted at all,27 yet as Huber's article
demonstrates, many prior users manage to hang on. These persons, in spite
of their legal trespass, often do have the approval of their neighbors-or at
least some significant portion of them, as the Bundy imbroglio shows. And
as Huber' s discussion of the Point Reyes controversy also illustrates, users
in place may have an additional advantage if they can gamer public support:
they can leverage it to pressure political decision makers. 
28
It would seem, then, that DURPRICLs do have considerably more
weight on public property than on private property-or, at least, that is the
case for the federal public lands. But that "at least" qualification is im-
portant: it speaks to a second reason why DURPRICLs seem to occur so
regularly on public property.
The second reason for the prevalence of DURPRICLs on public prop-
erty creates somewhat more of a doubt about Huber's argument: Huber's
examples are drawn not from public property generally but from a special
type of public property. There is a distinct possibility that the federal public
lands are an exceptional and odd version of property owned by the public
and managed by governments. Perhaps the DURPRICL phenomenon on the
25. See R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L. Q.
331,343 (1983).
26. See Rose, supra note 24, at 58.
27. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947).
28. See Huber, supra note 1, at 1035 (describing how the owner of a Point Reyes oyster
farm got California Senator Diane Feinstein's backing for an extension of his fishing per-
mit; the effort was ultimately unsuccessful, however, when environmental opponents or-
ganized against continued fishing).
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federal public lands does deviate substantially from the experience of pri-
vate property owners. But it might also deviate from the experiences of
other kinds of public owners.
In fact, governmental bodies take ownership of all kinds of property
where DURPRICLs are not at all evident. Governments own waterworks,
municipal parks, office buildings, electrical utilities, streets and roads, and
in these contexts, governments behave much like other kinds of owners.
One does not notice durable private claims on the New Jersey Turnpike, in
the Library of Congress Reading Room, or in the Pima County Courthouse.
More than that, governmental property ownership sometimes takes di-
rect aim at prior uses precisely in order to demolish them. In the 1950s and
1960s, urban renewal programs bought up private property in forced sales
and then turned it over to developers with the express purpose of getting rid
of prior uses, under the sometimes thin veil of "blight" removal.29 In the
view of a number of critical commentators at the time, such programs some-
times succeeded all too well, giving rise to the popular and bitter joke that
the real name of urban renewal was "Negro removal.,30 And urban renewal
was by no means the first such governmental attack on prior uses. Almost a
century earlier, New York created its iconic Central Park on land that had
previously contained a small African-American community and a number
of informal settlers; these people were summarily expelled and their struc-
tures demolished.31 Whatever one's assessment of the wisdom or justice of
such policies, DURPRICLs were nowhere to be seen in these examples of
governmentally owned property; quite the contrary, private claims were
ousted, no matter how durable.
All this raises doubts regarding whether the federal public lands are an
exemplar of public property more generally. Indeed, the Constitution itself
embeds a distinction between what are now considered two major classes
of federally owned property: Article I property and Article IV property. The
former includes so-called federal "enclaves"-post offices, army bases,
governmental office buildings, and other kinds of property that serve direct
federal ends. Over time, most of these federal enclaves were ither reserved
29. See Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 46-47 (2003).
30. Id. at 47. Justice Clarence Thomas referred to this phrase in his dissent in Kelo v.
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
31. Susan Bennett, "The Possibility of a Beloved Place": Residents and Placemaking
in Public Housing Communities, 19 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 259, 259-61 (2000).
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from Article IV public lands or acquired under the auspices of Article I,
Section 8, the "necessary and proper" clause,32 although the now-belea-
guered Post Office got a clause of its own in Article 1.33 These Article I
enclaves have few DURPRICLs. Eudora Welty may have written a story
whose protagonist explained "Why I Live at the P.O.," but there are no other
known characters like this at the P.O., or at other Article I property sites
either.
34
Instead, the DURPRICL phenomenon appears to be an issue regarding
just one type of governmentally owned property: Article IV property, which
consists of virtually all the other property that the federal government owns.
Article IV property applies to the great swaths of property that the federal
government acquired in large part by purchase and by war, but for no par-
ticular federal purpose.35 As Huber capably describes, Congress originally
did leave the public lands in a state of more or less open access for the ben-
efit of early settlers and other exploiters; only later did Congress repurpose
these lands for various other ends like parks, forestry, grazing, and oil leas-
ing, as the federal government shifted to a "proprietary" mode of manage-
ment.
But Article IV lands have always suffered from a certain vagueness and
drift. The republic's early statesmen and politicians were not certain what
to do about all this land, a fact perhaps reflected in the buried location of
Article IV's property clause. Section 3, the property clause, is tucked in
among other clauses about full faith and credit and extradition, along with
the now-disgraced state obligations to return fugitive slaves; in substance,
moreover, the section kicks the can down the road by simply saying that
Congress is to have authority over the public lands. 36 Congress, in the early
years, quickly decided on settlement and exploitation as the goal, as Huber
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
33. Id.
34. EUDORA WELTY, Why I Live at the P.O., in A CURTAIN OF GREEN 89 (Harvest
Books 1979) (1941).
35. The original public lands derived from the period of the Articles of Confederation,
from cessions by the states that had had large western lands as colonies-cessions de-
manded by the less-endowed states (notably, Maryland) that feared overweening influence
by the larger states. See Jerry A. O'Callaghan, 1776-84: Catalyst for Nationhood, 31 J.
FOREST HIST. 133, 134-138 (1987); George W. Geib, The Land Ordinance of 1785: A
Bicentennial Review, 81 IND. MAG. HIST. 1, 1-3 (1985). Notable later additions include
the Louisiana Purchase and the southwestern and western territories acquired after war with
Mexico.
36. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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illustrates, but it wavered between selling these lands and effectively giving
them away to audacious early settlers, newly formed states, and powerful
interests like timber cutters and railways.37 In the years before the Civil
War, the settlement of the public lands was a matter of intense interest in
the constitutional debate over slavery. 38 But constitutional law scholars to-
day tend to pay little attention to the property clause,39 now apparently a
dull thing by comparison to the powerful Article I (congressional powers),
the jurisprudentially rich Article III (judicial power), the glamorous First
Amendment (freedom of speech, assembly, and religion), or the rights-rich
Fourteenth Amendment (due process and equal protection obligations of the
states).
So, what is the problem with the Article IV federal public lands? Why
has the shift from the open access model to the proprietary model been ac-
companied by so permissive an attitude about nonconforming uses held
over from the past-a phenomenon that really does not affect many other
kinds of public property? The remainder of this comment gives four possi-
ble answers implicit or explicit in Huber's analysis; some overlapping, but
others more intuitively obvious. I would suggest hat all of them distinguish
the federal public lands from other kinds of public property and thus might
weaken Huber's implicit assumption that the federal public lands can stand
in as an example of public property generally.
1. Bigness. This is the most intuitive reason for permissiveness: the
federal public lands occupy an enormous territory, commonly approximated
at one-third of the nation, largely situated in the western states and Alaska.
40
37. See Robert L. Glicksman & George Cameron Coggins, Hardrock Minerals, En-
ergy Minerals, and Other Resources on the Public Lands: The Evolution of Federal Natu-
ral Resource Law, 33 TULSA L. REV. 765, 777-78 (1998) (citing varied recipients of give-
aways of federal public lands in the early republic); see also Patrick Austin Perry, Law
West of the Pecos: The Growth of the Wise-Use Movement and the Challenge to Federal
Public Land-Use Policy, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 275, 280-87 (1996) (describing haphazard
and ill-enforced federal land, mineral, and timber laws through the 1870s).
38. See generally Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress "Without Limitation": The
Property Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1, 36-55
(discussing the infamous Dred Scott case and its denial of Congress's ability to ban slavery
in the territories)
39. Id. at6 n.21.
40. See generally PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S
LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAW
REVIEW COMMISSION (1970).
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An area this large raises major challenges for policing. Private property
owners are not charged with managing such huge areas, and neither are
other governmental owners. New York's Central Park may be large as city
parks go, but it is totally dwarfed by the federal public lands in, say, Utah,
where the federal public lands comprise sixty-five percent of the state.
41
The sheer size of the federal public lands helps explain why there are private
lessees and other permittees on the federal public lands to begin with: man-
agement of areas so immense almost necessarily requires delegation to oth-
ers. In a scenario of limited resources, it makes more sense to direct and
police new uses than to try to get rid of old ones, for reasons discussed be-
low.
2. Heterogeneous constituencies, or public choice. The federal public
lands are not only large, they are also diverse; and with that diversity comes
a great diversity in the groups with an interest in the management and use
of the lands. But as Huber shows, the intensity of these groups' interests
also varies, largely in proportion to their occupation of or proximity to the
lands in question.42 Furthermore, among those in close proximity to the fed-
eral public lands, long-term users are the most intensely interested of all.
Like weeds and gophers, already-established users are apt to be much more
tenacious than ew claimants. This is for psychological reasons: the famous
"endowment effect" supposedly makes losing what you have weigh more
heavily than gaining some new good.43 There are financial reasons too; ex-
isting users often have capital investments that depend on continuing use-
and by God, they are going to fight for them.
By contrast, there are many other interested parties who would like to
see the public lands devoted to this or that purpose, but their interests are
sporadic, relatively small-scale, and they sometimes involve passive uses
without major investment; for example, birding. By comparison to, say, a
current coal-mining enterprise, how intensely will a scattered set of New
41. Stephen Urquhart, Protecting Access to Federal Lands: The Roads Less Traveled,
15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 192, 192 (2001).
42. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 1, at 991 (mining interests' domination of bids for
nearby mining sites); id. at 1005, 1029 (strength of ranchers' grazing claims on adjacent
federal lands); id. at 1017-18 (cabin residents' illegal expansion of sites in National For-
ests).
43. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Own-
ership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1551-1552 (1998) (describing experiments howing an
endowment effect).
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Hampshire birders-even birders with expensive binoculars-fight to halt
the Wyoming pit mine that has already levelled the bird habitat and bristles
with huge, heavy equipment? This classic public choice scenario-concen-
trated and intense interests versus diffuse and mild ones-was analyzed
many years ago by Joe Sax in the famous public trust article that awakened
so much interest in the management of the federal public lands.
44
Once again, consider an ordinary municipal park as an example of a
different kind of public property: the scene is one where the dominating
constituencies are basically all local, instead of a scene in which intense
local users are pitted against diffuse and distant ones. People living near the
park are likely to have a considerably greater interest in it, but at least there
is a nearby pool of potentially interested parties, including other city resi-
dents who can actually frequent the park.45
3. Blurred missions. In the early republic, the purposes to which the
Article IV lands would be put were undefined-open access, as Huber says,
or, more colloquially, anything goes. But even with the arrival of Huber's
proprietary model, the purposes to which the public lands should be put
remain vague. The guiding principle for the lands under the administration
of both the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land management is "Multiple
Use/Sustained Yield," commonly known as MUSY. 46 It is hard to justify-
or to dispute-any particular choice under such a latitudinarian standard.
Even in lands like the national parks, supposedly administered under a prin-
ciple of "dominant use," multiple constituents can drive administrators in
contrary directions. Alston Chase some years ago fulminated over the influ-
ence of the hunters who wanted Yellowstone National Park to act as a giant
elk reserve at the expense of native vegetation and other wildlife.47 Mean-
while, ranchers outside the Park push to reduce the size of the Park's bison
44. Sax, supra note 17.
45. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102
MICH. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2003) (noting the substantial but incomplete influence on Central
Park of wealthy nearby residents).
46. Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOL-
OGY L.Q. 140, 203-205 (1999).
47. ALSTON CHASE, PLAYING GOD IN YELLOWSTONE: THE DESTRUCTION OF AMER-
ICA'S FIRST NATIONAL PARK 18-37, 50-53 (1986).
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herd, whose wanderings, they say, might spread brucellosis to their ani-
mals.48 Then there are the campers, backpackers, geyser-watchers, biolo-
gists, wildlife viewers, snowmobilers, and more and more interests, all of
which have their own lists of demands for what the Park should be.
In short, given the cacophony of voices and the blurred purposes of fed-
eral public lands, it is not so surprising that prior users can slip off the en-
forcement radar. Again, a municipal public park like Central Park may have
multiple uses and purposes, but by comparison to the federal public lands,
Central Park's mission is a laser beam, much reducing the opportunities for
private claims altogether, not o speak of durable ones.
4. And something else: more historical echoes. Huber's excellent
presentation gives readers a history of the federal public lands that illustrates
their particular sensitivity to durable claims-although, in my view, that
history does not necessarily affect other kinds of public property. I would
like to suggest another lingering leftover from the past, one that may still
embolden both old and new users of the federal public lands in particular
and leave federal officers on the defensive.
In the spirit of Huber' s article, I first go back to the early republic, and
I consider again why statesmen of that era were so anxious to settle the
public lands with private owners-that is to say, why those statesmen were
willing in the first place to countenance private claims to the public lands
(the predecessors to the claims that have now become DURPRICLs).
Historian Thomas Le Duc once called the early decision to disperse the
federal lands to private owners a "fateful" one, but one for which Americans
at the time undoubtedly had differing reasons.49 Economic and defense rea-
sons clearly loomed large, as Huber argues. Many in the new American re-
public hoped to use the western lands to pay back the nation's debts and to
fund other useful projects. Moreover, their pervasive conviction was that
these lands should be devoted to farming, and farming was considered
something to be done by private efforts, not governmental ones.
50
48. Peter Morrisette, Is There Room for Free-Roaming Bison in Greater Yellowstone?,
27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 467, 477-478 (2000); Robert B. Keiter & Peter H. Froelicher, Bison,
Brucellosis, and Law in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, 28 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1
(1993).
49. Thomas Le Duc, History and Appraisal of U.S. Land Policy to 1862, in LAND USE
POLICY AND PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 3, 4-5 (Howard W. Ottoson ed., 1963).
50. O'Callaghan, supra note 35, at 134; Le Duc, supra note 49, at 5.
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But another, less widespread motivation was also in play as they con-
sidered the future of the public lands: the preservation of small-'R' republi-
canism. Given the very sharp historical consciousness of statesmen in the
new republic, their knowledge of the English past, and their familiarity with
Blackstone's Commentaries, some were certainly aware of the traditional
role that a large landed endowment could play in funding a monarchy, and
of the way that an endowment could free kings from the need to ask Parlia-
ment for taxes.51 More specifically, they would have known that in the years
prior to the outbreak of the English Civil Wars in the mid-seventeenth cen-
tury, the Stuart monarch Charles I had attempted to squeeze revenues from
the royal endowment in order to avoid calling an increasingly rebellious
Parliament.
52
Charles I's efforts to avoid Parliament ultimately failed dramatically,
but for at least some early Americans, republican prudence added to other
reasons for getting the public lands out to private owners rapidly and for
assuring the political future of those owners, so as to ward off anything that
might approximate a royal domain. One of the new nation's first and most
important acts under the Articles of Confederation was to enact the North-
west Ordinance,53 not only encouraging sale and settlement of the public
lands, but also making certain that the western settlers could establish states
51. For historical consciousness, ee, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (discussing the politics of Henry VIII's adviser Cardinal Wolsey); FEDERALIST No. 69
(Alexander Hamilton) (referring to powers of Stuart Kings Charles I and Charles II). See
also Blackstone's remark that "fortunately for the liberty of the subject" British monarchs
had dissipated the royal domain, a point that St. George Tucker nailed down in a note to
his 1803 edition of Blackstone's Commentaries. 2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIR-
GINIA 306-307 (1803) (citing RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 10 (1784) to assert that the dissipation of a once-substantial
royal domain had made the crown dependent on the people).
52. See KEVIN SHARPE, THE PERSONAL RULE OF CHARLES 1116-120 (1992) (describ-
ing Charles' much-hated efforts to assert control over the royal forests); see also Le Duc,
supra note 49, at 4-5 (observing that some with long memories in the American founding
period "entertained phobias of quitrents, crown lands, and royal forests"); Mark Kish-
lansky, Charles I: A Case of Mistaken Identity, 189 PAST AND PRESENT 41, 41-48 (2005)
(describing the longstanding attention riveted on Charles' downfall as well as his supposed
flaws).
53. NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787, art. V, 1 Stat. 51 n.(a).
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of their own on an "equal footing" with existing states.54 The 1787 Consti-
tution included a much stronger chief executive-worryingly like a king to
some of the Antifederalists, particularly since they thought that the new
"consolidated" national government would be too large for genuine repub-
lican self-governance.55 But the new national government continued the
equal footing doctrine for the western lands, a practice that should have al-
layed lingering concerns about a new kind of royal domain.
56
Nevertheless, the republican worry about the federal public lands-that
they might become a fund to make the federal government independent of
the people-continued to surface from time to time. In 1803, the year of the
Louisiana Purchase, the Appendix to St. George Tucker's edition of Black-
stone's Commentaries made a pointed comment that all governments, re-
publican as well as monarchic, were subject to this danger. 57 The issue re-
ignited briefly three decades later among the fierce objections to a Senate
proposal that threatened to limit public land sales. In urging continued dis-
posal, South Carolina Senator Robert Hayne cited the danger of government
funded by a "permanent national treasury" rather than taxes, "whether to be
derived from public lands or from any other source."58 Even Joseph Story
referred to the concern of some that the public lands might turn into some-
thing like a royal domain, although Story dismissed the concern as insuffi-
ciently attentive to the difference between monarchies and our own repub-
lican polity.59 This response begged the old antifederalist question whether
54. Robert S. Hill, Federalism, Republicanism, and the Northwest Ordinance, 18 PUB-
LIUS 41, 47-51 (1988).
55. See Raymond B. Wrabley, Jr., Anti-Federalism and the Presidency, 21 PRESIDEN-
TIAL STUD. Q. 459, 463-66 (1991) (Antifederalists' concerns about monarchic features of
presidency); Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: AntiFed-
eralism from the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74, 89-
93 (1989) (Antifederalists' arguments that proposed national government would be anti-
republican).
56. Carolyn Landever, Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New Federal-
ism and State Jurisdiction on Public Lands, 47 FLA. L. REV. 557, 562 (1995).
57. Tucker, supra note 51, app. 284-285.
58. 21 REG. DEB. 33-34 (1830) (statement of Sen. Hayne). Senator Daniel Webster
responded that the income from the public lands benefited all the people. Id. at 38 (state-
ment of Sen. Webster). See also PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVEL-
OPMENT 9-11 (1968) (describing debate).
59. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 1320-21, at 196-197 (Boston, Hillard, Gray & Co. 1833).
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such a large government could be truly republican, an objection of which
Story was well aware. 6
0
But memories of an independent domain to fund Stuart tyranny seemed
to fade as settlers poured into the western lands-lands that in great part
were practically given away. So long as federal landownership seemed a
temporary way station on the way to private property, the government's Ar-
ticle IV property could hardly threaten the nation's republican government
or the new states' sovereignty, in spite of the minor federal powers left over
from territorial days. 61 Once new states were formed, one might think that
Article IV federal land ownership was almost like any other kind of private
ownership-just that it was private land manquid.
But it was precisely the paradigm shift that Huber analyses, from open
access to proprietorship, that made federal ownership different from other
kinds of ownership. When in the later nineteenth century the federal gov-
ernment started to make plans of its own for its Article IV lands, it also
began to argue that the federal landowner was a landowner with a special
status. 62
What one federal forest lawyer called "antifederalist leanings" against
such expansive claims led to constitutional challenges as early as the later
nineteenth century, but to little avail.63 Federal claims of special status cul-
minated in the twentieth century in such cases as Kleppe v. New Mexico,
64
which roundly affirmed powers in the federal landowner not granted to
other landowners-not because these lands served any enumerated Article
I purpose like the post office or national defense or other federal enclave
60. Id. § 1280, at 158 (referring to fear at the time of the Louisiana Purchase that the
United States had already been too geographically large for a national government).
61. See United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526 (1840) (United States could continue to
lease rather than sell federal land in Illinois after the territory became a state).
62. See Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1928) (United States was entitled
to reduce deer herd to protect national forest despite state game law to the contrary); United
States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927) (United States may protect national forests by pro-
hibiting fires on nearby land); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525-526 (1897)
(United States has powers of ordinary landowner on its lands but also the power to prevent
effective enclosure of its property by measures akin to police power).
63. Philip P. Wells, Philip P. Wells in the Forest Service Law Office, FOREST HIST.,
Apr. 1972, at 22, 24 (reprint of Letter from Philip P. Wells, Law Officer, U.S. Forest Serv.,
to Gifford Pinchot, 1st Chief of U.S. Forest Serv. (Mar. 27, 1913)).
64. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
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properties, but simply because these massive lands belonged to the federal
government. 
65
Today, these assertions of the special status of Article IV property have
fueled an ever-simmering revolt in the western states-the states that con-
tain such large percentages of federal land. The so-called Sagebrush Rebel-
lion of the 1980s, now said to be in a new iteration, often prominently in-
cluded demands that the federal public lands be granted to the states and
localities or to private owners. 66 The current echo of early republican anxi-
eties sounds in the hatred and distrust of "Washington." Cliven Bundy's
supporters have been known to sport the white wigs of the revolutionary era
and they are fond of claiming support from the Constitution.67 As odd and
anachronistic as these antics may seem to the rest of the country, Sagebrush
westerners sniff something like the odor of a royal domain in the special
status of the federal public lands, a domain controlled by dictatorial bureau-
crats who hold their region in a subordinate status.
In reality, of course, the federal public lands are very far from generating
vast independent revenues for the federal government; quite the contrary,
some in Congress have fretted over their lax management for many years.
68
Moreover, no part of the country has greater access to the federal public
lands than the West, and in general no part of the country has bellied up
65. For differing views of this subject, compare, e.g., Appel, supra note 38, at 10, 78
(arguing that the federal government has very extensive governmental powers over Article
IV lands) to Landever, supra note 56, at 572-590 (arguing that the federal government was
thought to have limited power under the Property Clause until the twentieth century) and
David E. Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283,
361-362 (1976) (arguing that the federal power over Article IV lands is largely that of an
ordinary landowner).
66. See George Cameron Coggins & Doris K. Nagel, "Nothing Beside Remains": The
Legal Legacy of James G. Watt's Tenure as Secretary of the Interior on Federal Land Law
and Policy, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 473, 492-97 (describing origins and various goals
of first Sagebrush Rebellion, as well as relations with Reagan Administration). For a more
recent iteration, see, e.g., Editorial, Just What We Don't Need: A New Sagebrush Rebellion,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2014), http://articles.latimes.conV2014/apr/27/opinion/la-ed-federal-
lands-western-states-sagebrush-rebel-20140425 (decrying efforts to remove public lands
from federal control).
67. Jaime Fuller, Everything You Need to Know About the Long Fight Between Cliven
Bundy and the Federal Government, WASH. POST (April 15, 2014, 2:15 PM), http://www
.washingtonpost.conmnews/the-fix/wp/2014/04/15/everything-you-need-to-know-about-
the-long-fight-between-cliven-bundy-and-the-federal-government.
68. See Gates, supra note 58, at 9-11 (describing congressional debate over sale of
public lands in 1830); see also Huber, supra note 1, at 1027-1029 (discussing late nine-
teenth-century congressional ction to reserve some federal lands and resources).
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more readily to the federal trough.69 Federal contributions to the western
states signal the ways in which the modem federal, state, and local relation-
ships have become more symbiotic than confrontational. For many who re-
gard constitutional law as an evolving venture, federal authority on the pub-
lic lands may seem a predictable response to the scale of modern environ-
mental and natural resource management demands. But to some, like Cliven
Bundy and his militiamen friends, the federal public lands are a constant
reminder of the potential ascendancy of distant autocracy. It is not just the
executive branch that could seemingly use the public lands to undermine
the liberties of the people; it is the entire federal government.
And so, I would suggest, the lingering bogeyman of autocracy offers a
rationale and an excuse for DURPRICLs on the Article IV federal lands,
adding to the claimants' tenacity and sometimes to their capacity to intimi-
date. Certainly there are other reasons why the federal landlord is so indul-
gent to prior uses, including those reasons discussed above: size, diversity,
blurry purposes, and susceptibility to concentrated special interests. All
these factors make this kind of public property a special case among public
properties. But he peculiar political concerns from the past enlarge these
factors with a kind of republican righteousness, augmenting the reasons
why the Article IV lands have special problems with DURPRICLs.
Bruce Huber's excellent article argues that we need to be cautious about
creating new entitlements to use the federal public lands, particularly in con-
nection with renewable energy installations like solar or wind power. These
are likely to take up vast stretches of public land, and his history suggests
that new permittees might outlast their welcome in the future. His warning
for the federal public lands is certainly well taken.
But does his warning apply to other kinds of publicly held property?
Take a municipal park: if such property is relatively discrete in size, held
for a more specific purpose, and influenced more evenly by the relevant
constituencies, it would seem to generate fewer problems with durable pri-
vate claims-in large part because it would have been far slower to grant
any private claims to begin with (I am tempted to say, fewer DURPRICLs
because fewer PRICLs).
69. Robert Jerome Glennon, Federalism as a Regional Issue: "Get Out! And Give Us
More Money!", 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 837-842 (1996).
CLAIMING WHILE COMPLAINING
An interesting test case for Huber' s warning might be the new forms of
hybrid property found in environmental trading markets (ETMs), which in-
clude cap-and-trade programs that set overall limits to pollution or extrac-
tion of a common good like air or water, dividing the usable portion into
individual permits and allocating those permits to particular users who may
trade the permits to others. ETMs have been created at both the state and
federal levels, and in spite of their mixed record, they are currently under
much discussion as methods for reducing greenhouse gases.
70
The best-known and most successful ETMs to date in the United States
have been federal, particularly the cap-and-trade program for the acid rain
precursor sulfur dioxide (SO2), along with a scattering of other cap-and-
trade programs, including some for fisheries.71 These federal ETM success
stories suggest a pattern akin to, but not exactly the same as, the one that
Huber sees in the public lands. In spite of arguments from economists that
environmental permits should be allocated initially by auction to the highest
bidders, these entitlements have been regularly grandfathered to prior pol-
luters in the case of S0272 and to the major fishermen in the case of fishing
rights.73 The story thus has not been so much one of the durability of prior
entitlements as it has been indulgence to those who would otherwise be los-
ers in a regulatory change.
Indeed, the ETM experience suggests that the durability of private
claims on Article IV lands can be seen not so much as the exemplar of a
problem with public property as an exaggerated instance of a more general
resistance to regulatory change-resistance that has to be overcome, if at
all, by paying off those who did well in a prior regime. In that sense, Huber' s
analysis of private claims on federal public lands seems to be a particularly
70. For some examples of state and federal programs aimed at climate change, see
Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Ap-
proach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54 (2005); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market
Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 293-96 (2000) (discussing mixed record of ETMs
as of 2000). For news and reports on the burgeoning development of ETMs and similar
programs in a wide variety of environmental areas, see ECOSYSTEM MARKET PLACE,
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.conpages/dy-
namic/web.page.php?page-id=7183&section=about us&eod= 1#pes_5.
71. For examples of fisheries regulated by tradable rights regimes, see Wyman, supra
note 19, at 164-176 (describing these regimes in U.S. fisheries).
72. Merrill, supra note 70, at 284.
73. Dallas DeLuca, One for Me and One for You: An Analysis of the Initial Allocation
of Fishing Quotas, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 723, 732-733 (2005).
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acute example of a more general pattern, one that has been studied espe-
cially by economist Gary Libecap: regulatory regimes cannot change, even
for the betterment of the public overall, without taking into account the dis-
tributional demands of those who did well under the old regime. 
74
The larger lesson would seem to be that we need to be on the lookout
for the kinds of private entitlements that we create with any governmentally
sponsored program, but most especially where the program is large and dif-
ficult to monitor, the purpose is not well-defined, and public choice factors
loom large. Unfortunately, Article IV lands exemplify all these characteris-
tics in very large measures, but it is not so clear that other public proper-
ties-like the hybrid property right in ETMs-share these special problems
of durability.
In particular, other kinds of public property do not share the small-'R'
republican legacy that echoes in some westerners' attitudes toward the pub-
lic lands. Conflicts dating from before the founding of the United States live
on in the debates over Article IV public lands, in spite of the centuries that
have passed and the practical mutual relationships that have emerged be-
tween our national and state or local enterprises. On the federal public lands,
in the famous lines penned by William Faulkner, "The past is never dead.
It's not even past."
75
74. GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989).
75. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 73 (Vintage Books 2011).
